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Summary findings
Debates about the appropriate role, policies, and  Promote the health and well-being of its citizens (the
mistitutions of the state are often hampered by the lack of  social development index measures human development
a definition for "good government."  To provide a  and equitable distribution of income).
quantifiable measure of good government, Huther  and  *  Create a favorable climate for stable economic
Shah develop an index for the quality of governance for  growth (the economic management index measures
a sample of 80 countries. They apply the index to the  outward orientation,  independence of the centrai bank,
debate on the appropriate level of fiscal decentralization.  and an inverted debt-to-GDP ratio).
In measuring the quality of governance, the authors  In relating the index of governance quality to degree
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citizens (the citizen participation index measures political  between fiscal decentralization and quality of
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*  Provide effective public services efficiently (the  surprising.
government orientation  index measures judicial and
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L Introduction
Debates on the appropriate role of the state and appropriate  policies and institutions  to
further this role are typically carried out by relying upon anecdotal evidence in the absence
of  a quantifiable definition of "good government".  This paper attempts to fill this void by
developing a gauge of the quality of government through the construction of an index of
governance quality for a sample of eighty countries.  This index is offered as a  starting
point for an objective assessment of various economic policies to  further the quality of
governance rather than as a precise and definitive indicator of governance quality.  After
describing the construction of the index and the results, we provide an application to the
debiate  on the appropriate level of decentralization of fiscal powers.
This application provides empirical support for the theoretical underpinnings of the fiscal
federalism literature.  Governance quality is enhanced, according to this theory, by more
closely matching services with citizen preferences, and by moving governments closer to
the people they are intended to  serve, which ensures greater accountability of the public
The views  expressed  in this paper are those  of the authors alone and should not be attributed  to the
World  Bank  Group.  The  authors  are grateful  to participants  of  USAID  seminar  on Democracy  and
Governance,  ECLAC  seminar  on Decentralization  held in Venezuela  and the World  Bank  informal
seminar  for helpful  comments  on earlier  versions  of this paper. Please address  all comments  to
Anwar Shah, World  Bank, Room  G6-079, 1818  H Street,  NW, Washington,  DC 20433,  USA.closely matching  services  with citizen  preferences,  and by moving  governments  closer to
the people they are intended  to serve, which ensures  greater accountability  of the public
sector.  The paper is  organized as follows.  Section II presents an approach to the
measurement of  governance quality.  Section III  applies this  measurement to  the
decentralization  debate. Section IV notes limitations  of the approach  and a final section
highlights  main conclusions  of this paper.
II. Measuring  Governance  Quality
Governance is a  multi-faceted concept encompassing  all aspects of  the exercise of
authority through formal and informal institutions  in the management  of the resource
endowment  of a state. The quality of governance  is thus determined  by the impact  of this
exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by  its citizens.  There is growing
awareness in the development  community that a comprehensive  look at the enabling
environment of institutions (World Bank 1992, 1994, Picciotto, 1995, Hansen, 1996,
Huther, Roberts and Shah, 1996), interests (Shah, 1996), and policies is needed in
determining  the net impact  of the state on the well-being  of its citizens. While  no single
index can conceptually  capture all aspects of this enabling  environment,  a focus on key
observable aspects of  the  governance dimensions can  be  helpful in  providing a
comparative  perspective on differentials  in the quality of governance among different
nations.  The key observable aspects of the governance  dimension considered in this
paper are: citizen voice and exit;  government orientation; social development and
economic  management.  Accordingly,  the governance  index we have composed  has four
composite indices which have been chosen to provide an indication of a government's
ability to:  1) ensure political  transparency  and voice for all citizens,  2) provide  efficient
and effective  public services,  3) promote  the health and well-being  of its citizens,  and 4)
create a favorable climate for stable economic  growth. These factors  are among those
cited in the World Bank's (1992)  booklet, Governance  and Development  as representing
the most important  goals that ought to be faced by governments. It is important  to note
that these are goals which all governments  can be expected  to pursue regardless  of their
2country's  wealth.  In developing these indices, we have relied upon existing indicators
which measure salient characteristics of each of these indices (see Table 1).
Table 1:  Components of Governance Index
Index Name  Component Indices
CP  Citizen Participation Index
PF  Political Freedom
PS  Political Stability
GO  Government Orientation Index
JE  Judicial Efficiency
RT  Bureaucratic Efficiency
CO  Lack of Corruption
SD  Social Development Index
HD  Human Development
GI  Egalitarian income distribution
EM  Economic Management Index
00  Outward Orientation
CB  Central Bank Independence
DB  Inverted Debt to GDP Ratio
The ability to create an index of governance quality has been enhanced by the creation of
several quality of life indices in recent years.  For example, we make use of previously
published  indices  measuring  health,  education,  political  freedom,  and  governnent
cornuption. The increasing interest in developing countries as potential borrowers has led
to increased data, largely through surveys, on a wide variety of institutional issues.  The
index developed in this paper takes advantage of this increase in data availability as well
as more traditional  sources of information on developing countries such as the World
Bank  and  International  Monetary  Fund.  Using  the  objectives  described  above,  the
resulting index of governance quality (GQI) is:
GQ:[  =  Cp  a, * GO  a 2 *  SD  a3 * EM  1 ala 2 a3
where:
3CP  =  PF 1 * PS 1-l
GO  =  RT71* C  Y2 *JE >  1 Y2
SD  =  HD5*GI's
EM  =  OO 1* CB E2  *DB'-e  _2
where a,  3,  y, 6 and £ are weights indicating relative importance of components to overall
governance assessment.
The citizens participation index is composed of two indices -- one that assesses the degree
of political freedom within a country and one that assesses the level of political stability
of a country.  Political freedom assesses the ability of citizens to influence the quality of
governance they receive.  The political stability index was composed by a commercial
group with the perspective of an investor in mind.  This perspective may understate the
ability of  citizens to participate in  governance decisions in  some countries  but it is  a
reasonable indicator of  continuity of citizen participation.
The orientation of governments towards the provision of public goods and  services is
assessed through three  indices; judicial efficiency, bureaucratic efficiency, and  lack of
corruption.  Improving judicial  efficiency has been recognized as a pre-requisite for a
country's  development at least since the 1960s (Blair and Hansen, 1994) and the costs of
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption have been well-documented (de Soto, 1989). All
three of these indices are based on surveys which attempt to gauge the degree to which
public  sector  employees  are  focused  on  serving  the  populace  rather  than  enriching
themselves or their political parties.
Social development within a country is assessed through two widely known components,
the United Nations'  human development index and gini coefficients (which quantify the
degree of income inequality).  The human development index combines estimates of life
4expectancy, average education levels and per capita income.  The gini coefficients are
based on recent surveys of income distribution.
The quality of a government's  economic management is assessed through performance
indicators of fiscal policy (debt-GDP ratio), monetary policy (central bank independence)
and trade policy (outward orientation).  For monetary and trade policy, we were able to
use indices which capture, to  some degree, the institutional orientation of government.
The central bank independence index is based on the legally stated independence of the
central  bank.  The  outward  orientation  index  includes  a  component  of  investors'
perceptions of the receptivity of a government to trade.  Unfortunately, the fiscal policy
indlex, debt-GDP ratio, is a particularly  imperfect measure of  institutional  orientation.
This limitation is offset to some degree by the historical perspective it provides since debt
is a cumulative measure of a country's fiscal policies.  The indices of fiscal and monetary
policy may be subject to a bias against poor countries. It is possible, for example, that the
debt-GDP ratio may be biased against countries that are growing rapidly, regardless of
the quality of their economic management since public investment typically has very long
term  payoffs.  Or, conceivably, a country with  a poorly developed revenue collection
system  may  find  monetization  of  debt  to  be  the  most  efficient  form  of  financing.
However, neither of these indices are strongly correlated with  income, suggesting that
bias, if it exists, is not strong.
A more general question regarding bias is whether aggregating these indices introduces a
systematic bias towards or against any country or group of countries.  For example, does
the better  availability of data from developed countries mean that these countries, as a
group, are rated higher or lower than LDCs?  Or, does the composition of these indices by
western  oriented  academics,  businessmen  and  economists  lead  to  a  bias  against
governments pursuing alternative goals?  The answer to the first question is that it seems
unlikely.  The answer to the second question is, yes, although ideological differences are
more  likely to  develop over  the weights  applied to  each objective rather  than which
objectives should be included.  The index is flexible enough that adjustments could easily
5be made if one wishes  to argue, say, that citizen  participation  is not a relevant component
of governance  quality.
The issue of the appropriate weight of each category is clearly a sensitive one.  For
example, should a government that creates a  favorable economic climate but lacks
political freedoms  be judged a higher or lower  quality government  than one that provides
political  freedom  but hinders  economic  growth? Where  possible,  our answer has been to
give each of these categories  equal weight. This was done, in part, to convey  a sense of
impartiality to  the process.  More importantly, this approach places no  excessive
emphasis  to any single index.  This is important  given the nature of the indices used --
some of them are, by necessity,  subjective  and others may reflect assessments  that may
change quickly.  Equal weighting  means that potential biases or errors do not unduly
influence  the composite  index.
With the exception  of the social development  index, all component  indices were given
equal weight. For social development,  the Human  Development  Index  coefficient,  6, was
given a  weight of  0.80 because of the broad, encompassing  nature of the  Human
Development  Index (see Appendix  I for compilation  techniques,  sources, and limitations
of these indices). The results are presented  Table 2 for 80 countries. The indices  used to
create this index were modified in two ways.  First, indices for which higher numbers
represented  worse governance  (gini and debt/GDP)  were inverted.  Second, all indices
were re-scaled so that each has a mean of 50.  The outward orientation  index required
additional  modification  to combine  the initial 1980-83  index with the speed  of integration
index for 1980-83  to 1990-93. In cases where the underlying  index did not provide an
assessment  of countries  in our sample,  we have extrapolated  index numbers  based on the
performance  of comparable  countries  (see Appendix  II for component  indices).
6Table 2:  Ranking of Countries on Governance Quality
(a) High
Country  Governance  Country  Governance
Quality  Index  Quality  Index
Switzerland  75  France  60
Canada  71  Czech Republic  60
Nelherlands  71  Belgium  58
Germany  71  Malaysia  58
Un:ited States  70  Israel  57
Austria  70  Trinidad and Tobago  57
Finland  68  South Korea  57
Sweden  67  Greece  55
Australia  67  Spain  55
Denmark  67  Hungary  54
Norway  67  Costa Rica  54
United Kingdom  66  Uruguay  54
Ireland  66  Italy  53
Singapore  65  Chile  53
New Zealand  64  Argentina  52
Japan  63  Jamaica  52
(b) Medium  (c) Low
Romania  50  Egypt  40
Panama  50  Morocco  40
Venezuela  50  China  39
South Africa  50  Kenya  39
Pol;md  49  Honduras  38
Mexico  48  Indonesia  38
Saudi Arabia  48  Cameroon  38
Jordan  48  Nicaragua  37
Pera  48  Nepal  36
Oman  48  Pakistan  34
Ecuador  48  Nigeria  33
Colombia  47  Ghana  32
TurLisia  47  Zambia  29
Russia  46  Togo  29
Brazil  46  Uganda  28
Turkey  46  Yemen  28
Sri Lanka  45  Senegal  28
Paraguay  45  Sierra Leone  26
Philippines  44  Malawi  26
Zimbabwe  44  Iran  26
Thailand  43  Zaire  25
India  43  Rwanda  X  22
Cote d'Ivoire  42  Sudan  20
Papua New Guinea  41  Liberia  20
Source:  Authors  'calculations
7There is a high correlation between governance quality and per capita income -- OECD
countries dominate the top governance category and none are in the two categories with
the  poorest  governance.  Conversely,  there  are  no  African  countries  in  the  top
governance category.  The correlation between the index of governance quality and per
capita GDP appears to be much stronger than its weight of 6.7% (through the HDI) would
suggest.  This high correlation between governance quality and per capita GDP raises the
question of causality.  If demand for high governance quality is driven by high per capita
income, then an index of governance quality will simply reflect per capita income.  Or, if
there are necessary pre-conditions for high per capita income, such as outward economic
orientation and work force education, then high per capita income will reflect high quality
governance.
It seems likely to us that causality runs both ways -- some components of governance do
enhance the likelihood of higher per capita income and higher per  capita income does
increase the demand for higher quality governance.  The challenges for those postulating
a relationship between governance quality and income that only runs in one direction are
the outliers -- why, for example, is Ireland's per  capita income so low given its  high
governance quality or, if causality runs the other way, why does Czech Republic  have
such good governance given its per capita income?
The good performance of European countries is not  limited to  Western Europe.  The
Central  and  East  European  countries  (as  well  as  Latin  American  countries)  have
combined  improvements  in  citizen  participation  and  economic  management  with
relatively high marks for social development.  Strong geographical patterns appear in all
parts of the world -- European countries govern well, African and South Asian countries
govern poorly, Latin American and East Asian countries are somewhere in the middle.
One possibility  these patterns raise is that  countries'  standards for  governance quality
may be influenced by the performance of their neighbors.
8Relationship to Factors Influencing Development
In Table 3 we have shown correlation coefficients for several factors that may influence,
or may be influenced by, governance quality:  per capita PPP income, GDP growth, and
military  spending.  The  strong positive  correlation between  income  and  governance
quality  supports  the  casual  observations  drawn  above.  The  negative  correlation  of
military spending with governance quality is not statistically strong but it does suggest
that it may be governments that are being defended rather than countries.  The positive
colrelation  between the ten year economic growth rate and governance quality supports
the argument that the institutional focus of government is an important determinant  in
economic development.  Also, since the highest income countries have generally not had
the highest  growth rates over the last decade, the positive correlation between  higher
growth  and  better  governance  suggests  that  good  governance  improves  economic
performance rather than vice-versa.
Table 3:  Governance Index Correlation Coefficients
Governance  Income  Military (as %  Annual Growth
Index  govt spending)  (85-94)
Governance  1.00  0.89  -0.16  0.25
(0.00)  (0.22)  (0.03)
Income  1.00  -0.11  0.26
(0.42)  (0.03)
Mi:litary  1.00  0.10
(0.47)
Annual Growth  1.00
Sou'rces: Income and Growth from World Bank (1996b), Military and Subnational Expenditures from International
Monetary Fund (1995)
III:.  Quality of Governance and Fiscal Decentralization
During the past half a century, developing countries have, in general, followed a path of
centralization  and  as  a  result,  these  countries  are  more  centralized  today  than
9industrialized  countries  were in their early stages of development  (Boadway,  Roberts and
Shah, 1994).  The economic framework developed in the fiscal federalism literature
addresses the question of the appropriate level of centralization  by assigning taxing,
spending  and regulatory  responsibility  to various  levels of government  and their interface
with the private sector and the civil society at large.  This framework  argues for the
assignment of a responsibility  to the lowest level of government  that can internalize
benefits and costs of decision making for the specific service (see Shah, 1994). The
subsidiary  principle adopted by the European  Union conforms  to this view by requiring
that the assignment  of responsibility  should  be to the lowest level of govermnrent  unless a
convincing case can be  made for a  higher level assignment. A number of  recent
developments,  discussed  below, are prompting  these countries  to have a second look at
this issue and almost all developing  countries  with population  size greater  than 20 million
are rethinking  their fiscal arrangements.
Major catalysts  for change
Major catalysts for change include the demise of capitalism, national government
failures, subnational government failures, assertion of  basic  rights by  the  courts,
globalization  of economic  activities  and the demonstration  effects  of the European  Union
(see Shah, 1995). The demise of  communism  prompted  a major change  in government
organization  and geographical  boundaries  of some countries. In other countries,  national
governments have failed to  ensure regional equity, economic union, central bank
independence,  a stable macroeconomic  environment  or local autonomy. The record of
subnational  governments  is also not very commendable. Subnational  governments  have
often followed beggar-thy-neighbour  policies, sought to  seek free ridership with no
accountability  and, in pursuit of narrow  self-interest,  often  undermined  national  unity.
The judicial systems  in some  countries  are also providing  stimuli  for change  by providing
a broader interpretation of basic rights and requiring that national and subnational
legislation  conform  to the basic rights of citizens. The emergence  of a new "borderless"
10world  economy  complicates  this picture  by bringing new  challenges to  constitutional
fecderalism. These  challenges arise  from  the  decline of  nation  states in  carrying  out
regulation  of  certain  economic  activities  as  borders  have become  more  porous  and
information technology  has weakened their ability to  control information flows.  The
European Union's  policies and principles regarding subsidiary, fiscal harmonization and
stabilization checks are also having demonstrable effects on country policies.
The overall impact of these influences is to force a rethinking on assignment issues and to
force a jurisdictional  realignment  in many countries around the globe.  In developing
coumtries,  rethinking  these  arrangements  has  led  to  gradual  decentralization  of
responsibilities to lower levels in a small but growing number of countries. Some writers
have  cautioned  against  such  a  shift  in  division  of powers  in  a  developing  country
environment and have highlighted the "dangers of decentralization" (Prud'homme,  1995,
also  see  Tanzi,  1996). These  authors  have  expressed  concerns  ranging  from  macro
mismanagement, corruption, red tape, and widening gulf between rich and poor persons
regions  under  decentralized fiscal system.  Sewell (1996) and McLure  (1995) provide
rejoinders to these concerns by marshaling conceptual arguments and anecdotal evidence
in support of their viewpoints.
In the following, we reflect upon various elements of the "dangers of decentralization"
based  upon  available  empirical  evidence.  In  relating  decentralization  to  quality  of
governance, four aspects of governance quality are stressed: citizen participation, social
development,  government  orientation and  economic management.  These aspects  are
considered in turn in the following paragraphs.
Citizens participation
Citizen participation ensures that public goods are consistent with voter preferences and
public  sector  accountability.  Such participation  is  possible  only  if  political  freedom
(voice and  exit)  is permitted  and  political  stability prevails.  We combined  individual
11rankings  of  countries  on  these  indicators  to  develop  a  composite  index  of  citizen
participation.  We  find  that  both  sub-indices  are  positively  correlated  with  fiscal
decentralization.  The correlation coefficients in Table 4 indicate that this relationship is
statistically  significant  which  suggests  that  citizen  participation  and  public  sector
accountability go hand in hand with decentralized public sector decision making (see also
Figure 1).
Table 4: Correlation  of Subnational  Expenditures  with Governance  Quality  Indicators
Pearson Correlation  Coefficients
Citizen  Participation
Political  Freedom  0.599**
Political Stability  0.604**
Government  Orientation
Judicial Efficiency  0.544**
Bureaucratic  Efficiency  0.540**
Absence  of Corruption  0.532**
Social  Development
Human Development  Index  0.369*
Income  Distribution  0.373*
(inverse  of gini coefficient)
Economic  Management
Central  Bank Independence  0.327*
Inverse  of Debt to GDP Ratio  0.263
Outward  Orientation  0.523**
Governance  Quality  Index  0.617**
Level  of  significance  is in parentheses
*  Pearson  correlation  coefficient  is significant  at  the  0.05%  level  (2-tailed  test)
**  Pearson  correlation  coefficient  is significant  at  the  0.01%  level  (2-tailed  test)
12Gtovernment  Orientation
Public sector orientation plays an important  role in public sector performance.  If the
public  service is  oriented towards serving its  citizens, bureaucratic red  tape  and
corruption would be minimal and judiciary will further enforce accountability  though
tirnely and fair decisions  in the administration  of justice.  One finds such an orientation
typically lacking in some developing countries where the civil service pursues rent
seeking and power  and influence  through  command  and control  and bureaucratic  red tape
and graft.
A composite ranking of countries  of three indicators  of government  orientation,  judicial
efficiency,  bureaucratic  efficiency,  and the lack of corruption,  provides  a good indicator
of public sector orientation and performance.  We relate the degree of expenditure
decentralization  to the ranking of countries on individual indicators as well as to the
composite  rank on government  orientation  and find that all of these correlations  show a
positive,  and statistically  significant,  association  (see Table  4 and Figure  2). This suggests
that typically decentralized  country  are more responsive  to citizen  preferences  in service
delivery and strive harder to serve their people than centralized  countries. Several case
studies  corroborate  above  findings.  Crook  and Manor  (1994),  Meenakshisundaram  (1996)
based upon a review  of experience  of the Indian state of Karnatka,  and Blair (1996)  based
upon  Philippines'  more  recent  experience with  decentralization, conclude  that
decentralized  democratic  governance  had a positive impact  on the quality of governance
especially  in re-orienting  government  from a command  and control to a service provider
role (see also Blair and Hansen, 1994). Landon (1996)  carried out a study of education
costs in  Canada and concluded that local control regimes were more successful in
controlling  overhead  costs than provincial  control  regimes. Humplick  and Moini-Araghi
(1996) report that for a large sample of countries decentralization  leads to lower unit
administration  costs for road services.
13Social Development
Two  aspects  of  social  development  are considered: human  development  and  income
inequality.  For ranking countries in terms of their achievements on human development,
we  solely  rely  on  the  United  Nations'  index  on  human  development.  This  index
incorporates life expectancy, adult literacy, educational enrollments and per capita GDP
in purchasing power parity terms.  Egalitarian nature of the society is captured by  an
inverse rank on the Gini coefficients estimated by Deininger and Squire (1996).  Table 4
shows that fiscal decentralization is positively correlated and statistically significant with
both the indices (see also Figure 3).
Macroeconomic  Management
It is frequently argued that a decentralized public policy environment of the type found in
developing  countries  contributes  "to  the  aggravation  of  macroeconomic  problems"
(Tanzi,  1996, p.3 05). In the following, we reflect upon the available empirical evidence
on aspects of monetary and fiscal policies to form a perspective on this issue.
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is clearly a central function and best entrusted to an independent central
bank (Shah,  1994, p.1 1). The critical question then is whether or not independence of
central bank is compromised under a decentralized fiscal system.  One would expect, a
priori,  that the  central bank  would  have  greater  independence under  a  decentralized
system  since such a system  would require clarification of rules under which  a central
bank operates, its functions and its relationships with various governments.  For example,
when  Brazil  in  1988 introduced  a  decentralized federal  constitution,  it  significantly
enhanced the independence of the central bank (Bomfim and Shah, 1994). On the other
hand,  in  centralized  countries  the  role  of  the  central bank  is  typically  shaped  and
influenced by the Ministry of Finance.  In an extreme case, the functions of the central
14bank of the U.K., the Bank of England, are not defined by law but have developed over
time by a tradition fostered by the U.K. Treasury.
For  a  systematic  examination  of  this  question,  we  relate the  evidence  presented  in
Cukierman,  Webb  and  Neyapti  (1992) on  central bank  independence  to  a  share  of
subnational expenditures in total spending. The correlation coefficient in Table 4 shows a
weak  but  positive  association  confirning  our  a  priori judgment  that  central  bank
independence is strengthened under decentralized systems.  Increases in monetary base
caused by the Central Bank's  bailout of failing state and non-state Banks represents an
important  source of  monetary  stability and  a  significant obstacle to  macro  economic
management.  In  Pakistan,  a  centralized  federation,  both  the  central  and  provincial
governments  have, in  the past,  raided nationalized  banks.  In Brazil,  a  decentralized
federation, state banks have made loans to their own governments without due regard for
their profitability  and  risks.  A central bank role in ensuring arms  length transactions
between  governments  and  the  banking  sector  would  enhance  monetary  stability
regardless of the degree of centralization.
The empirical  evidence presented suggests that such arm length transactions are more
difficult to  achieve in countries with  a centralized structure of governance than under
decentralized  structure with a  larger set  of players.  This  is because  a decentralized
structure  requires greater  clarity in  the roles  of various  public  players, including  the
central bank.
Fiscal Policy
In  a  centralized country, central govermment assumes the exclusive  responsibility  for
fiscal policy. In decentralized countries, fiscal policy becomes a responsibility shared by
all levels of government and the federal (central) government in these countries use their
powers  of the purse (transfers) and moral  suasion through joint  meetings to  induce  a
coordinated approach.  Several writers  (Tanzi,  1995, Wonnacott,  1972) have argued,
15without empirical  corroboration, that the financing of subnational governments is likely
to be a source of concern within open federal systems since subnational governments may
circumvent federal fiscal policy objectives. Tanzi (1995) is also concerned with deficit
creation and debt management policies of junior governments. Available theoretical and
empirical work does not provide support for the validity of these concerns.  On the first
point, at a theoretical level, Sheikh and Winer (1977) demonstrate that relatively extreme
and unrealistic assumptions about discretionary non-cooperation by junior jurisdictions
are needed to conclude that stabilization by the central authorities would not work at all
simply because  of this  lack of  cooperation.  Their  empirical  simulations  for  Canada
further suggest that failure of a federal fiscal policy in most instances cannot be attributed
to  non-cooperative junior  governments'  behavior.  Saknini, James  and  Sheikh  (1996)
further  demonstrate  that,  in  a  decentralized  federation  with  markedly  differentiated
subnational  economies  with  incomplete markets  and  non-traded  goods, federal  fiscal
policy acts as an insurance against region-specific risks and therefore decentralized fiscal
structures do not compromise any of the goals sought under a centralized fiscal policies.
On the  second point noted by Tanzi,  empirical evidence from  a  number of countries
suggests that, while federal fiscal policies typically do not adhere to the European Union
(EU) guidelines that deficits should not exceed 3% of GDP and debt should not exceed
60% of GDP, junior governmnents  policies typically do.  This is true both in decentralized
federal  countries such  as Canada and  centralized federal countries  such as  India and
Pakistan. Centralized countries even do worse on these indicators. For example, Greece,
Turkey and Portugal do not satisfy the EU guidelines.  The results in Table 4 provide
weak confirmation of our empirical observations -- the coefficient, while positive, is not
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
Outward Orientation
Economic liberalization is now commonly accepted as a cornerstone of good economic
management.  World  Bank  has  recently  ranked  countries  on  the  openness  of  their
16economies taking into account factors such as GNP originating from trade, manufacturing
exports,  foreign direct investment as a share of GDP, credit rating  and manufacturing
content of exports. This index is related to the degree of expenditure decentralization and
find a  positive relationship between these two indicators.
Economic Management
When we combine  the three  aspects of  economic management considered above in  a
quality index of economic management,  the resulting index shows a positive association
with the degree of fiscal decentralization (see Figure 4).  This is to be expected as the
decentralized systems are more transparent in defining the role of various public agents
and place a greater premium on accountability for results.
Quazlity  of Governance and Decentralization
Finally, we combine indices on economic management, social development, government
orientation and citizen participation to derive an overall index of governance quality. This
index is then related to the degree of fiscal decentralization. Given the positive correlation
between  all  of  the  governance  quality  component  indices  and  the  composition  of
government  expenditures, the positive relationship between fiscal  decentralization and
governance quality is unsurprising (see Figure 5).  What may be surprising is the strength
of this correlation:  if one assumes that the mix of national and subnational expenditures
is an explanatory variable for governance quality, the resulting OLS regression yields an
R2  of 0.38 (the coefficient on subnational expenditures was 53.07, with a standard error
of  10.99).
Causality
The relationship between the level of decentralized expenditures and governance quality
appears to be strictly increasing but clearly there must be some form of "Laffer Curve" --
17it is easy to construct cases where complete decentralization of expenditures would lead
to  lower  quality  governance  than  where  there  is  a  mix  of  national  and  subnational
expenditures.  However, the data do not show that even the most highly decentralized
governments have increased decentralization at the expense of lower quality governance.
This  suggests  that  highly centralized countries  can improve their  governance  quality
through  more  decentralized  expenditures  without  the  risk  of  engaging  in  excessive
decentralization.
In conclusion,  recent discussions on the appropriate level of decentralization  of fiscal
expenditures have largely been theoretical or anecdotal (for example, see Prud'homme
(1995) and Sewell (1996)). The decentralization side of this debate cites efficiency gains
due to greater voice for local constituents while the centralized side cites efficiency gains
from  economies  of  scale  (often  from  consolidating human  or  physical  capital).  The
conclusion  of  the  value  of  greater  decentralization was  informed  by  examining  the
relationship  of fiscal decentralization to various individual and composite measures of
quality of governance. At an empirical level, it appears that governance quality may be
enhanced by greater decentralization.  It should be noted however, that this analysis is a
macroeconomic  one  and  cannot  be  applied  to  specific  expenditures.  Even  at  the
theoretical  level,  the  appropriate mix  of national  and  subnational  roles  and  thereby
expenditures differs by sector (or, even by project).
IV.  Reservations
As a starting point, we accept the caveats offered by the authors of the individual indices
that we have used.  These caveats generally note that the indices are meant to  convey a
general  placement  of  countries rankings  rather  than precise  assessments  of  countries
relative performance.  Additionally, the authors generally acknowledge the potential for
errors in individual rankings since many of the indices rely on subjective judgments  or
limited  surveys.  It  can be  argued  that  aggregation  may offset  the  statistical  biases
associated with the techniques and biases of the individual indices.  A larger issue is less
18an  econometric  one  than  a  theoretical  one  relating  to  the  weights  applied  to  each
component index.  Our approach of applying equal weights to each component index is
open to  criticism that one  component, say citizen participation or social development,
should  be  weighted  more heavily than  another, say economic management.  Making
adjustments to these weightings would influence the rankings of individual countries but
our preliminary impression is that such adjustments would not affect the general trends
noted. above.
Omissions
Many of the indices used in the governance index did not cover all of the countries that
we have included in our sample.  In cases where index numbers were not available (see
Table  5), we sought assessments of the relative performances of missing countries from
World Bank staff.  The majority of missing cases were from Africa although indices of
government orientation were missing for Central Europe.  Estimates for missing values
were made by senior members of the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department.
Table 5:  Omissions from Original Indices
Index  Omitted  (%)
Political  Freedom  6
Political  Stability  28
Judicial  Efficiency  28
Red T  ape  28
Corruption  20
Human  Development  0
Gini Coefficient  19
Outward  Orientation  0
Central  Bank Independence  30
Debt / GDP  Ratio  21
Of  the  eighty  countries  for  which  we  were  able  to  construct  the  governance  index,
subnational  expenditure data were only  available for forty.  These countries, listed  in
Appendix III, are fairly well distributed across per capita income groups and geographic
19regions although developed countries are more strongly represented in this group than the
larger group for which the governance index was calculated.
V.  Conclusion
Discussions  and policy work regarding the role, scope and effectiveness of government
have typically taken place in the absence of empirical measures of governance quality.
This  paper introduces a measurement that will allow both theoretical work and policy
issues to be discussed in the framework of a concrete definition of governance quality.
The definition we have used could easily be modified to reflect different beliefs about the
relevance  of the components used in this index.  The index could also be narrowed or
broadened to reflect differences in beliefs about the role and scope of government.
The application of this index to the decentralization debate highlights that the polarization
of opinion in the absence of hard empirical evidence can be overcome with the use of an
appropriate standard of reference such as the one used here. The use of this index allows
us  to  reach  unambiguous  conclusions  regarding  the  net  positive  effects  of  fiscal
decentralization on public sector performance in a majority of countries.
20Appendix I: Sources and quality of data and explanations regarding development of
component indices
Political  Freedom:  Haq  (1995).  This  index  measures four  factors that  reflect  an
indlividual's ability to exercise political freedom:  a country's political process, statutory
freedoms, an individuals ability to exercise freedom of expression, and degree to which
discrimination is tolerated.
Political  Stability,  Judicial  Efficiency,  Red  Tape:  Mauro  (1995).  These  indices,
developed  by  Business  International  Corporation  (BIC),  are  unavoidably  subjective.
These indices were developed with an investor's perspective in mind.  This perspective
may lead to different assessments of, say, judicial  efficiency than an index with  a less
pecuniary perspective.  These indices, which  we have not been updated, are based on
older data than the other indices -- 1980-83.
Corruption:  Transparency  International/Gottingen  University  (1996).  This  index,
frequently  updated, is based on survey results  from several risk assessment consulting
groups,  the  Global  Competitiveness  Report,  and  the  Institute  for  Management
Development.
Human Development Index:  Human Development Report (1996).  This index, published
by the United Nations Development Program measures life expectancy, adult literacy,
enrollments in primary, secondary and tertiary education institutions, and per capita GDP
in purchasing power parity terms.
Gini Coefficients:  Deininger and Squire  (1996).  These estimates of income equality are
based  on household  surveys which are presented by the authors  as both  a substantial
improvement over previous work in both data quality and coverage.
Outward Orientation:  World Bank (1996a).  This  index uses an initial assessment  of
outward  orientation  made  for  1980-83  and  modifies  it  according  to  the  speed  of
integration  index calculated for  1990-93.  The factors  composing the index  are:  a
population-adjusted trade  ratio, country credit  rating by Institutional  Investor, Foreign
Direct Investment as a share of GDP (in PPP terms), and the share of manufacturing that
is exported.
Central  Bank  Independence: Cukierman,  Webb  and  Neyapti  (1992).  This  index  is
compiled from examination of 16 statutory aspects of central bank operations including
thce terms  of  office  for  the  chief  executive  officier,  the  formal  structure  of  policy
foimulation, the bank's  objectives (as stated in its charter), and limitations on lending to
the government.
Debt to GDP Index:  Compiled from IMF (1995) and IFS (1995) using data from most
recent year available.
21Quality of Indices
For detailed information on the component indices used, we refer those interested to the
original works for discussions of the index strengths and weaknesses.  In cases where the
indices have been produced for several years (HDI and gini coefficients), the authors have
had time to respond to criticisms of the initial versions.  The indices used from Mauro
were  constructed  by  a  commercial  organization, Business  International  Corporation,
which  sells updated versions of  its indices.  Presumably, the version  made public  by
Mauro  is  old  enough  that  its  commercial  (and,  perhaps,  academic)  value  is  low.
Unfortunately, an updated version was out of the range of our research budget.
The political freedom index created by Haq is new both in the sense that there are no
previous versions and in that it addresses a topic that had previously not been subjected to
formal indexing.  The corruption index is updated annually and reflects  the results  of
several surveys on bureaucratic honesty.  The outward orientation index is an  updated
version of an index first created in the mid-1980s.  The central bank independence index
is relatively new and represents the legal characteristics of a country's central bank.  As
the authors note, there is often a discrepancy between the statutory independence of a
central bank  and its  independence in practice.  The authors  attempted to  capture this
effect, by developing a second index which measures the frequency of turnover of heads
of central banks.  This second index has not been incorporated into this paper because of
the small number of countries covered.
Note that although all of these indices have been published in the past 3 years, the data
from  Mauro and  Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti  are somewhat older.  This may  bias
results for, or against, specific countries which have experienced rapid change since the
early 1990s.  The Mauro indices, for example, have assessments of Liberia and Nigeria
which,  given more recent events, seem high.  The indices have not  been adjusted to
reflect these changes in order to preserve the internal consistency of these indices.
Adjustments
Political Freedom:  mean shifted to 50.
Political Stability, Red Tape, Judicial Efficiency:  mean shifted to 50.
Corruption:  unchanged.
Human Development Index: mean shifted to 50.
Gini Coefficients:  10 - sqrt(gini), mean shifted to 50.
Outward Orientation:  ln(speed of integration index) used as percent change, then applied
to initial index, mean shifted to 50.
Central Bank Independence: mean shifted to 50.
Debt to GDP Index: 2 - debt/gdp, mean shifted to 50.
Means were shifted by:
Initial Index Number * 50 / Average of Initial Index
22Appendix I1: Composite Indices
Country  Name  Citizen  Government  Social  Economic
Participation  Orientation  Development  Management
Switzerland  67  86  65  85
Canada  64  83  66  72
Netherlands  65  86  66  69
Germany  62  74  64  85
United States  66  80  64  71
Austria  65  73  65  78
Finland  66  83  65  60
Sweden  66  83  65  59
Australia  61  83  63  65
Denmark  65  83  64  60
Norway  68  84  64  54
United Kingdom  61  78  66  62
Ireland  60  74  63  67
Sin,gapore  59  86  60  59
New  Zealand  64  88  64  48
Japan  62  76  64  52
France  64  65  62  52
Czech Republic  59  54  62  66
Belgium  62  72  66  40
Malaysia  54  59  54  64
Israel  52  75  61  45
Trinidad and Tobago  59  53  58  58
South  Korea  51  52  62  63
Greece  60  47  63  52
Spain  56  52  66  48
Hungary  57  52  62  48
Costa Rica  62  46  58  51
Uruguay  64  53  56  45
Italy  59  43  63  52
Ch ile  49  69  57  42
Argentina  57  46  55  52
Jamaica  57  50  49  52
Romania  50  48  55  49
Panama  54  58  55  37
Venezuela  55  36  57  55
South  Africa  52  56  42  50
Poland  55  54  60  32
Mexico  49  42  54  48
Saudi Arabia  32  48  55  63
Jordan  49  58  52  36
Peru  44  53  48  46
Om.an  40  41  50  62
23Country Name  Citizen  Government  Social  Economic
Participation  Orientation  Development  Management
Ecuador  51  42  53  46
Colombia  47  40  55  50
Tunisia  46  40  51  53
Russia  54  32  59  46
Brazil  50  37  51  48
Turkey  48  38  48  50
SriLanka  46  51  49  36
Paraguay  46  43  46  44
Philippines  44  36  46  52
Zimbabwe  46  63  37  34
Thailand  43  30  56  50
India  50  37  35  53
Cote d'Ivoire  53  58  29  37
Papua New Guinea  54  29  36  52
Egypt  45  34  45  37
Morocco  38  52  40  32
China  38  25  46  56
Kenya  42  36  34  44
Honduras  45  37  39  33
Indonesia  40  24  48  46
Cameroon  42  42  35  32
Nicaragua  46  44  40  24
Nepal  45  39  29  35
Pakistan  41  24  36  38
Nigeria  44  22  32  41
Ghana  34  31  37  26
Zambia  38  24  31  25
Togo  37  22  30  27
Uganda  40  24  27  24
Yemen  28  28  26  31
Senegal  39  22  26  27
Sierra Leone  36  22  18  31
Malawi  31  28  25  20
Iran  20  14  52  29
Zaire  32  18  28  22
Rwanda  14  20  29  29
Sudan  18  22  29  16
Liberia  11  32  24  18
Source. Authors' calculations
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